National Identity and The Other in Belgium (Revised)

 The National Identity and the Other in Belgium

National identity

For many Americans, Belgium shows up in familiar, attractive images, a small European country known for cosmopolitan cities, with world renowned institutions. Yet scholars often treat Belgium as a case where national identity is not put together by a single shared language or unified cultural experiences. Instead, Belgium’s national identity is frequently understood as a set of dominant powers and institutional foundation that make the coexistence possible within a multilingual state. 

National identity is not simply a list of national traits a country has, like food or music. It is better understood as the stories and the groundworks of the country that defines who belongs to the nation, what binds the group together, and what values the nation represents. An idea in this ideology is that identity also becomes clearer through comparison, national identity gains meaning through contrast with those seen as “Others” (Triandafyllidou, 1998). Belgium is useful for studying this process because belonging is often multi-layered, and many citizens identify as Belgian while also identifying with a regional community.

 Belgium’s national identity is best understood as a systematic and societal project. It is built around constitutional membership but also built on multilingual and regional identities managed under one state, and political structures that require constant compromise. These same identities help explain how Othering operates in Belgium; especially internal Othering between Flemish and Wallonia communities and how that internal boundary makes the response to external others. (Maddens, Billiet, & Beerten, 2000; Izquierdo, 2014; Triandafyllidou, 1998).

 

Parts of Belgian national identity

One idea is that Belgium identity as civic rather than ethnic dispute. Maddens et al. describe a “republican” representation of national identity in which the nation is imagined as a “dynamic contract,” with membership grounded in shared rules and common political principles rather than ancestry (Maddens et al., 2000, p. 46). In this idea, Belgium becomes a nation held together by institutions with constitutional principles, civic participation, and rule-based belonging. This civic story supports Belgium’s outward presentation as tolerant and open. Maddens et al. note that Belgian authorities have emphasized values such as solidarity, tolerance, and multiculturalism, portraying Belgium as a state capable of mixing difference rather than resisting it (Maddens et al., 2000, p. 47). This narrative though does not erase social conflict, but it helps explain how the Belgian state attempts to justify itself and claims its legitimacy through managing coexistence.

A second major identity is symbolic unity because Belgian identity is often contested, symbolic symbols can become especially important for producing moments of national togetherness. Maddens et al. argue that the Belgian establishments has used opportunities to reinforce loyalty to the unitary state, describing the monarchy as its “most important asset” (Maddens et al., 2000, p. 47). They point to the death of King Baudouin in 1993 as a moment that produced an “unexpected upsurge” in patriotic feeling (Maddens et al., 2000, p. 47). This example shows how Belgian identity can be strengthened through shared symbolic events, even when everyday politics remains divided. This does not lead to symbols solving the structural tensions. Instead, it illustrates a key feature of Belgium’s national identity, that the state often relies on shared symbolic cultural symbols to create unity, rather than assuming unity is constantly happening. In that sense, Belgian identity sort of functions as something actively maintained to help with conflicts.

The last major identity emphasizes how Belgium’s political structure, especially its party system shapes identity. Izquierdo argues that Belgium’s political development and the linguistic sections have created a system in which parties operate largely within those regional sections, intensifying the separation between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking communities (Izquierdo, 2014, p. 12). This matters because parties do more than offer policy agendas, they can act as identity producers, repeatedly teaching citizens which collective interests matter and who represents “us.” Izquierdo’s analysis suggests that some Flemish parties frame their political mission explicitly around Flemish interests rather than Belgian commonality (Izquierdo, 2014, p. 59). In some cases, party discourse even questions whether a Belgian nation exists in a meaningful cultural sense (Izquierdo, 2014, p. 59). The point is not that Belgium lacks identity, but that national identity is contested in structure of the country since political life is organized through region-based parties and distinct public servants, national identity becomes an ongoing argument about whose nation the state serves.

 

Othering in Belgium

National identity becomes most visible when we ask who counts as an other. Triandafyllidou emphasizes that identity is produced through contrasts with Othering is figures imagined as different or threatening (Triandafyllidou, 1998). Belgium demonstrates how this process operates both internally (between communities inside the state) and externally (toward immigrants and foreigners). What makes Belgium different is that internal and external Othering can reinforce each other rather than producing a single us versus them mentality.

Internal Othering

Internal Othering appears when Flemish and Wallonia communities see one another as outsiders within the same state. Maddens et al. link this to regional autonomy and administration support of the sub-national nation-building, particularly in Flanders, where government has promoted Flemish national identity (Maddens et al., 2000, p. 47). Over time, this strengthens the sense that Flanders and Wallonia represent separate political communities rather than one nation. Izquierdo’s evidence shows how parties can sharpen this boundary. He notes discourse in which Belgium is seen as containing two different democracies that grow farther apart, and he discusses claims that Wallonia impose burdens on Flemish taxpayers (Izquierdo, 2014, p. 65). Even when such claims are politically strategic, they still define who we are (Flemings) and who is cast as an internal them (Wallonia). This helps explain why Belgium’s identity of compromise can coexist with intense political rivalry because compromise is necessary since internal boundaries are so strong.

External Othering

External Othering in Belgium often becomes visible through debates about immigration and integration, but it does not operate uniformly across regions. Maddens et al. provide a helpful conceptual distinction between an ethnic representation of national identity and a civic representation. In the ethnic model, identity is treated as heritage that must be defended, and foreigners are framed as threats; in the civic model, membership is based on accepting shared rules, and cultural identity is understood as potentially evolving through dialogue (Maddens et al., 2000, p. 46). This helps explain why identity relates to attitudes toward foreigners in complex ways. Maddens et al. report that in Flanders, strong Flemish identification correlates with more negative attitudes toward foreigners, while strong Belgian identification correlates with more positive attitudes. In Wallonia, the pattern is opposite where stronger Walloon identity correlates with more positive attitudes toward foreigners, while stronger Belgian identification correlates with more negative attitudes (Maddens et al., 2000, p. 45). Rather than reducing these findings to stereotypes, the key analytical point is that identity and Othering depend on context. Belgian identity does not always function the same way across the country, because regional political ideas shape what Belgian is.  

 

Conclusion

Belgium’s national identity is often misled as a divided country. This shows you a more precise argument that Belgium’s identity is an institutional and civic project built to manage multi-culturalism. It includes a civic narrative of membership based on shared rules and coexistence (Maddens et al., 2000, p. 46), an ideal of layered identities that are said to be complementary but remain in tension (Maddens et al., 2000, p. 47). At the same time, Belgium’s political structure and party system repeatedly reproduce region-based identity and keep Belgian identity contested (Izquierdo, 2014, pp. 12, 59). Othering is central to this story because Belgian identity becomes meaningful not only in contrast with external outsiders but also through internal boundary-making between Flemish and Wallonia communities (Triandafyllidou, 1998). Belgium’s national identity is not a single cultural thing. It is an ongoing negotiation over how difference can be governed without dissolving the state.

Maddens, B., Billiet, J., & Beerten, R. (2000). National identity and the attitude towards foreigners in multi-national states: The case of Belgium. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 26(1), 45–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/136918300115633

 

Triandafyllidou, A. (1998). National identity and the “other”. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(4), 593–612. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198798329784

 

Izquierdo, J. M. (2014). Belgian identity politics: At a crossroad between nationalism and regionalism (Master’s thesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville). https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4171&context=utk_gradthes